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For your interest? The ethical acceptability of using non-invasive prenatal 
testing to test ‘purely for information.’ 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) is an emerging form of prenatal 
genetic testing that provides information about the genetic constitution of a 
foetus without the risk of pregnancy loss as a direct result of the test 
procedure. As with other prenatal tests, NIPT can help to make a decision 
about termination of pregnancy, plan contingencies for birth or prepare to 
raise a child with a genetic condition. NIPT can also be used by women and 
couples to test purely ‘for information’. Here, no particular action is 
envisaged following the test; it is instead entirely motivated by an interest in 
the result. The fact that NIPT can be performed without posing a risk to the 
pregnancy could give rise to an increase in such requests. In this paper, we 
examine the ethical aspects of using NIPT ‘purely for information,’ 
including the competing interests of the prospective parents and the future 
child, and the acceptability of testing for ‘frivolous’ reasons. Drawing on 
several clinical scenarios, we claim that arguments about testing children for 
genetic conditions are relevant to this debate. In addition, we raise ethical 
concerns over the potential for objectification of the child. We conclude 
that, in most cases, using NIPT to test for adult-onset conditions, carrier 
status or non-serious traits presenting in childhood would be unacceptable.  
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For your interest? The ethical acceptability of using non-invasive prenatal 
diagnosis to test purely ‘for information.’ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For better or worse, the availability of prenatal screening and testing has 
undoubtedly increased the choices available to women and couples. Women 
may choose to access a prenatal test to determine the course of the 
pregnancy, to prepare for a safe birth or to adjust to the prospect of 
parenting a child who has or who will develop a genetic condition. The 
prenatal testing landscape has recently been changed by the development of 
non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), a new method of obtaining foetal 
DNA for analysis. A notable advantage of NIPT is that, unlike current 
prenatal diagnosis (PND), the test itself does not carry a risk of miscarriage. 
 
NIPT is not yet as robust and reliable as ‘traditional’ methods of prenatal 
diagnosis (PND), such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling. This 
means that it is still often regarded as only an “advanced screening” method, 
whether offered in a screening programme or as a stand-alone test.1 
However it is already possible to use NIPT to test for many of the same 
single-gene and chromosomal genetic conditions as PND; be it for a serious 
medical condition that presents in childhood, a serious medical condition 
 
                                                     
1 Benn PA, Borrell A, Cuckle H, et al. Prenatal detection of Down syndrome using 
massively parallel sequencing (MPS): a rapid response position statement from a 
committee on behalf of the Board of the International Society for Prenatal Diagnosis, 24 
October 2011. Prenat Diagn 2012; 32: 1-2. 
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that presents in adulthood, a non-serious medical condition or carrier status.2 
There has been considerable success in developing NIPT for a range of 
conditions and traits such as haemophilia, sex determination and trisomy 21. 
Complete sequencing of the foetal genome has also been achieved in a 
research setting.3 Although it remains a challenge, this paper rests on the 
assumption that NIPT can be used to interrogate the foetal genome in just 
the same way as with an invasive test. 
 
The wider ethical, legal and social implications of NIPT have been 
discussed elsewhere.4  However, one of the most striking possible 
implications of NIPT has not yet been addressed. Women and couples 
choose prenatal screening or testing for a variety of reasons, including 
determining whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy, or to increase 
 
                                                     
2 Ehrich M, Deciu C, Zwiefelhofer T, et al. Noninvasive detection of fetal trisomy 21 by 
sequencing of DNA in maternal blood: a study in a clinical setting. Am J Obstet Gynecol 
2011; 204: 205.e1-11.; Palomaki GE, Kloza EM, Lambert-Messerlian GM, et al. DNA 
sequencing of maternal plasma to detect Down syndrome: an international clinical 
validation study. Genet Med 2011; 13: 913-20.; Papageorgiou EA, Karagrigoriou A, Tsaliki 
E, et al. Fetal-specific DNA methylation ratio permits noninvasive prenatal diagnosis of 
trisomy 21. Nat Med. 2011; 17: 510-3. 
3 Lo YM, Chan KC, Sun H, et al. Maternal plasma DNA sequencing reveals the 
genomewide genetic and mutational profile of the fetus. Sci Transl Med 2010; 2: 61ra91; 
Chen S, Ge H, Wang X, et al. Haplotype-assisted accurate noninvasive fetal whole genome 
recovery through maternal plasma sequencing. Genome Med 2013; 5: 18 
doi:10.1186/gm422. 
4 See, e.g.: Benn PA, Chapman AR. Practical and Ethical Considerations of Noninvasive 
Prenatal Diagnosis. JAMA 2009; 301: 2154-2156; Newson AJ. Ethical aspects arising from 
non-invasive fetal diagnosis. Semin Fetal Neonatal Med. 2008; 13: 103-8.  
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their knowledge of their foetus with no intention to terminate. Because of 
the risk of miscarriage associated with invasive tests (around 1% depending 
on the test and its timing5), until now couples have been encouraged to 
consider the risk to the foetus of any invasive procedure when deciding 
about prenatal screening or testing. If this ‘barrier’ of risk to the foetus is 
removed, the uptake of testing in pregnancy (including requests for testing 
‘purely for information’, with no intention to terminate) might well be 
higher. 
 
We are interested in the ethical implications of the use of NIPT ‘purely for 
information.’ An interested couple may have a desire to undergo NIPT 
much in the same way that some people find out the sex of their foetus in 
utero through ultrasound scanning; not with the intention to detect a range 
of abnormalities, but to obtain information about the characteristics of the 
foetus, perhaps to help them bond with their baby, or simply to satisfy their 
curiosity. This use of NIPT ‘for information only’ might arise in both 
individual requests for testing or an organised screening programme. 
 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I introduces five clinical 
scenarios to describe possible uses of NIPT for information only. In Section 
II we give an account of the main arguments about genetic testing in 
children, which we then apply to prenatal testing in Section III. In Section 
 
                                                     
5 Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 2010. Amniocentesis and Chorionic 
Villus Sampling: Green Top Guideline No. 8. London: Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists. Available at: http://www.rcog.org.uk/files/rcog-
corp/GT8Amniocentesis0111.pdf, p2. [Accessed 18 December 2013] 
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IV we ask how, if at all, the introduction of the non-invasive aspect of 
testing affects the debate. We suggest that the most notable difference 
between using childhood or invasive prenatal testing for information only 
and using NIPT for information only is that NIPT may give rise to testing 
for ‘frivolous’ reasons, something that may be objectionable not because of 
its potential for harm, but because it may encourage the objectification of 
children.  
 
SECTION I. CLINICAL SCENARIOS 
 
To illustrate how the issue of using NIPT ‘purely for information’ may arise 
in practice, we have outlined five clinical scenarios. Each involves a 
planned pregnancy. 
 
(i) Requesting a test for carrier status 
Ms A is pregnant and is a known but unaffected carrier of the cystic 
fibrosis gene change. No gene change has been able to be identified 
in her partner, so their foetus is at low risk of being born with this 
condition. However Ms A is very interested to know whether the 
foetus also carries her gene change, even though she will not take 
any action based on this information. 
 
(ii) Requesting a test for a minor genetic condition 
Ms B is pregnant and has a genetic condition which carries no health 
implications but for shorter than normal height. A gene change 
causing this condition is known. Ms B wishes to know whether her 
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foetus also has this gene change but she wishes to continue the 
pregnancy whatever the result. 
 
(ii) Requesting a test for foetal sex 
Ms C and her partner are in the early stages of pregnancy. They are 
very excited to be pregnant after experiencing three miscarriages. 
They are intrigued to know the sex of their foetus and don’t wish to 
wait for a mid-pregnancy ultrasound to find out. They don’t have a 
preference for a particular sex. 
 
(iv) Requesting a test for a serious adult-onset condition 
Ms D is pregnant, and her partner has the gene change that will lead 
to Huntington’s disease (HD; an adult-onset neurodegenerative 
disorder), although he is currently symptom-free. Given their 
experiences, such as caring for a recently deceased relative who had 
HD, they would like to know whether their foetus has the HD gene 
change so that they could prepare themselves, and their child, for the 
future. They have no plans to terminate the pregnancy. 
 
(v) Offering foetal whole genome sequencing 
Ms E is pregnant with her first child. Her maternity care provider is 
linked to a research institute that has recently commenced a trial of 
foetal whole genome screening for any pregnant woman regardless 
of medical history. The trial involves analysing the whole genome of 
the foetus, using material obtained via NIPT. Results will provide 
information about all known conditions and traits. Ms E would like 
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to participate in this trial to obtain this information. She would like 
to know more about her foetus, but plans to continue the pregnancy 
whatever the tests reveal. 
 
In many instances of prenatal diagnosis or screening, a request for testing 
‘for information only’ (with no intention to terminate) would be relatively 
uncontroversial because there may be medical benefits such as managing 
pregnancy or birth, or providing the newborn with treatment that could be 
balanced against the risk of miscarriage. Making a test available by NIPT is 
therefore an unalloyed benefit in these kinds of circumstances. However in 
scenarios such as those described above, those requesting testing may be 
counselled against invasive testing as it would offer no prospect of medical 
intervention for a cure or alleviation of symptoms but risked the pregnancy. 
NIPT will alleviate this risk – does this make these kinds of prenatal tests 
defensible? Or is the converse instead true, that the ability to perform a test 
without risk is in fact something of a disadvantage as it is more likely to 
generate ethical difficulties and conflicts? 
 
In the analysis that follows, we recognise that there is no way of really 
knowing why a woman or couple will opt for a test; whether it be ‘for 
information only’, to inform a decision to terminate or continue with 
pregnancy.6 It is also possible that a person embarking on a test purely to 
gain information might change her mind about continuing the pregnancy on 
the basis of the results, especially if a serious genetic condition is revealed. 
 
                                                     
6 Duncan RE, Foddy R, Delatycki MB. Refusing to provide a prenatal test: can it ever be 
ethical?  BMJ 2006; 333: 1066-8. 
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For the purposes of this paper we are basing the option of testing ‘purely for 
information’ on expressed preferences at the time of testing. We 
acknowledge that generating information about a foetus can only ever be 
said definitely to have been 'for information only' with the benefit of 
hindsight. However there is always a chance that a woman may choose to 
end a pregnancy, for a variety of reasons. 
 
This possible difference between expressed and actual preferences might 
also have further moral implications, such as an increase in rates of 
termination. Thus the real-world scenarios are likely to be more complex 
than we have described them above. Nevertheless these scenarios are 
helpful to isolate and address the moral questions about testing purely for 
information. 
 
Some brief comments can also be made on the above scenarios. For 
example, unexpected results could arise from these tests (e.g. a lethal 
impairment or intersex status), potentially causing distress, and maybe also 
leading to a decision to terminate.7 Also, taking the whole genome 
sequencing scenario (v), would testing purely ‘for information’ be 
acceptable given that the information gained will be of less importance than 
with the ‘adult onset condition’ case (iv)? At least at the present, the ability 
to interpret genome wide datasets in relation to future health and the 
modification of lifestyle is limited, so that the harm they might cause may 
also be limited. However, the ability to interpret such data will doubtless 
improve. It would also be possible for parents to attach too much 
 
                                                     
7 With thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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significance to the results. In the section that follows we turn to the debate 
surrounding genetic testing in children, which provides a partial answer to 
these questions. 
 
SECTION II. SYNTHESISING THE ETHICAL DEBATE OVER 
GENETIC TESTING IN CHILDREN 
 
In many ways, testing a foetus ‘purely for information’ (whether in a 
screening or testing context) is based on similar principles to carrying out 
genetic tests on children and most of the arguments about the acceptability 
of testing children (at least those who lack capacity) will apply. In this 
section we briefly outline the relevant points, which relate to the child’s 
interests and privacy. This will then allow us to discuss the questions that 
remain about prenatal testing, and then non-invasive prenatal testing. 
 
The most salient factor in the debate about childhood genetic testing is 
whether the condition is a) childhood-affecting or b) adult-onset. 
 
a) Childhood-affecting conditions 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to test a child for a certain genetic 
condition is the interests of the child, which are usually considered 
paramount. There is a large literature about whether testing is in a child’s 
best interests.8 It is thought that, if they know their child’s genetic status, 
 
                                                     
8 See, e.g.: British Society for Human Genetics. 2010. Report on the Genetic Testing of 
Children. Birmingham, UK: BSHG (now British Society for Genetic Medicine). Available 
at: http://www.bsgm.org.uk/media/678741/gtoc_booklet_final_new.pdf [Accessed 
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parents may be better able to adapt psychologically to bringing up a child 
with a certain genetic condition and will be more supportive and nurturing 
parents as a result. Following testing, parents may also be better able to put 
in place social, practical and financial arrangements for care of their child, 
and the child can prepare him/herself psychologically for the onset and 
development of that condition. When a negative (no gene change identified) 
result is given, parents and their child may be less anxious about the child’s 
future, and need not make unnecessary financial and social contingency 
plans.9 However, if a gene change is identified there may also be increased 
anxiety for all concerned of watching a child for early signs of the condition 
in the family, or over-interpreting possible early signs that may not 
manifest. 
 
b) Adult-onset conditions 
Where a genetic test in a child is not diagnostic but predictive of adult 
health, a similar interests-focussed discussion may be had. Here the interests 
under consideration are those of the future adult whom the child will 
become. For example, parents may be able to prepare their child 
psychologically or financially for a future with a certain condition. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
18/12/2013]; Parker M. Genetic testing in children and young people. Fam Cancer 2010; 9: 
15-18.; Clarke A. What is at stake in the predictive genetic testing of children? Fam Cancer 
2010; 9: 19-22.; Malpas PJ. Predictive genetic testing of children for adult-onset diseases 
and psychological harm; J Med Ethics 2008; 34: 275-278. 
9 Clarke cautions against relying on genetic testing as a source of reassurance, since some 
will receive a mutation-positive result. Further, results will not necessarily remove the 
feeling of uncertainty either, since new questions arise: Clarke, Ibid. 
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Conversely, they may also limit their child’s future – to the detriment of the 
child – by failing to set up provision for their child’s adulthood. 
 
Notwithstanding this debate, finding out facts about an individual’s adult 
future is also often considered inappropriate as it delves into their (future) 
private sphere. Invading a competent adult’s privacy in order to improve 
their welfare is to exercise hard paternalism and is rarely justifiable. It may 
be thought that, since the individual being tested is a child at the time, 
decisions about that child’s interests rest with her parents or guardians, and 
that it is merely soft paternalism, which is deemed more justifiable (and 
perhaps even a duty). Indeed, parents often act against their children’s 
wishes in order to secure their future welfare as adults (for example by 
insisting on school attendance and instilling healthy eating habits). But we 
suggest there is good reason to think that testing children for adult-onset 
conditions would be to exercise hard paternalism. There are important 
differences between the arguments for testing for adult-onset conditions and 
other accepted interventions during childhood.  
 
First, paternalistic actions such as insisting on education and healthy eating 
habits usually have short-term benefits for the child as well as long-term 
benefits for the future adult. There are no short-term benefits either to a 
child knowing she will (or is very likely to) develop an adult-onset genetic 
condition or to the parents knowing this.  
 
Second, childhood is the most appropriate stage of development for some 
skills, knowledge, character traits and so on (e.g. healthy eating habits), but 
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is not the most appropriate stage for others (e.g. forming sexual 
relationships). This can be termed a principle of identifying the most 
appropriate life-stage for an action or intervention. For childhood genetic 
testing for adult-onset conditions, testing for most could not be justified at 
the life stage of a child. There are some genetic conditions for which effects 
can be lessened by early measures, such as having regular colonoscopies to 
identify early stages of bowel cancer in familial adenomatous polyposis coli 
(FAP). However there only a few such conditions. 
 
Third, there is a distinction between an action that widens an individual’s 
future choices and an action that narrows them down. For example, in 
insisting on a child’s education, a parent is increasing the future adult’s 
choices for further education, employment and participation in community 
life. In testing a child for an adult-onset condition, the parents are narrowing 
her options, at least because the (future) adult cannot change the past and 
choose for her parents not to know her results.  
 
In addition, if her parents tell her the results, she also cannot choose not to 
know herself. In this way, testing could also be said to violate the child’s 
‘open future’10 to decide for herself what tests to have.  Having information 
about an adult-onset condition may be harmful to the child. Rather than 
feeling psychologically prepared, the child may feel greater anxiety 
knowing she faces a future with a particular condition. It has also been 
 
                                                     
10 Feinberg J. 1980. The Child’s Right to an Open Future. In Whose Child? Children’s 
Rights, Parental Authority and State Power. Aiken W & La Follette H, eds. Totowa, NJ: 
Littlefield, Adams: 124-153 
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suggested that, if results were negative, the child may still experience 
anxiety.11 Parents may project unrealistic or unfair expectations onto their 
child, with harmful effect, and the child may find herself stigmatised, or her 
behaviour given a medical label inappropriately. 
 
Thus, unlike testing for conditions that usually affect children, it is arguable 
that knowledge about a person’s adult onset conditions is exclusively the 
business of the at-risk individual, not her parents. Parents who access 
personal information relevant to the adult their child will become are 
arguably invading her future privacy. Similarly, healthcare professionals 
who divulge information to parents about their future adult child are 
breaching confidentiality. Therefore there needs to be good justification for 
accessing and revealing personal facts about another (future) adult.  
This position is reflected in clinical practice12 and professional guidance 
about predictive genetic testing in children.13  
 
 
                                                     
11 See, e.g.: Codori A-M, Zawacki KL, Petersen GM, et al. Genetic testing for hereditary 
colorectal cancer in children: Long-term psychological effects. Am J Med Genet A 2003; 
116A: 117-128. 
12Steinbock B. Prenatal testing for adult-onset conditions: cui bono? Ethics, Bioscience and 
Life 2007; 2: 38-42. 
13 Borry P, Stultiens L, Nys H, et al. Presympomatic and predictive genetic testing in 
minors: a systematic review of guidelines and position papers. Clin Genet 2006; 70: 374-
381. 
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SECTION III. PRENATAL TESTING 
 
When the individual being tested is a foetus, rather than a child, the 
reasoning would appear to be identical unless the question arises of possibly 
terminating the pregnancy. Termination does not arise in the instance under 
discussion here, as we are considering testing ‘purely for information’ 
(albeit subject to the limitations identified in Section I above). Therefore, if 
a woman or couple intend to continue the pregnancy regardless of the result, 
most of the points we have made in relation to genetic testing in children 
can be applied to testing a foetus. The same considerations about interests 
and privacy apply.  
 
What is strikingly different between a child and foetus, however, is the 
status of the being whose future interests are being evaluated. In many 
jurisdictions, the foetus does not have the legal status of a child. The moral 
status of the foetus is less obvious and, indeed, hotly disputed. Any 
argument against testing a foetus for information for the sake of that being 
(as we have done above with testing children) would have to rely either on 
the foetus having rights and interests at the time of being a foetus, or on the 
claim that the future child or adult has interests that ought to be safeguarded 
in advance.  
 
We will not explore the question of whether a foetus has rights and interests 
at the time of being a foetus because this issue has been discussed 
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extensively in the context of termination of pregnancy.14 We also do not rest 
our position on the moral status of the foetus, as will be explained below. 
We do assume that a foetus does not have sufficient rights to override those 
of the prospective parents in circumstances of prenatal testing, but despite 
this the interests and rights of the future being remain relevant and could 
potentially override the rights of the prospective parents to access 
information. 
 
As we have discussed above, when considering testing children for adult-
onset conditions, it is fairly well accepted that the future adults’ interests 
should be safeguarded. In the case of a continuing pregnancy, the foetus is a 
future person, just as a child is a future adult. Duncan et al claim that, 
because the foetus is within the womb and therefore part of the woman, the 
woman has the right to information about the foetus.15 They claim that a 
woman does not lose her right to information simply because she wishes to 
continue her pregnancy. While this line of argument is convincing in 
termination cases, it cannot be applied with the same force in the case of 
testing for information only, simply because it is expected that there will be 
an individual resulting from the pregnancy. Thus, the moral rights of the 
potential future adult are in competition with the pregnant woman’s. It is 
also something of an illusion to think that the woman wants to know that her 
foetus does not have an adult-onset disorder. In fact, the woman wants to 
know that the future adult will not have the disorder. 
 
                                                     
14 See, for example: Glover J. 1977 Causing Death and Saving Lives. London: Penguin 
Books. 
15 Duncan et al, op. cit. note 6. 
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Although in many jurisdictions the foetus does not have the legal status of a 
child, in cases in which a decision has been made to continue pregnancy, it 
is likely (all being well) to be on the same path to adulthood as an existing 
child. Thus, any argument for not testing a child in order to protect the 
privacy of the future adult also applies to not testing a foetus in a continuing 
pregnancy.  This is to protect the interests and privacy of the future adult. 
As it is the future adult whose interests one is trying to preserve, it could be 
argued that it makes little difference when the act of gathering the 
information takes place. As Delatycki states: 
 
“If the ethical consequences dictate that it is preferable not to offer 
… [a test for Huntington’s] the fact that the test is prenatal rather 
than being a test on an individual outside the womb does not make it 
any more justifiable.”16 
 
If our claim that predictive genetic testing in children is usually 
inappropriate can be supported, and our claim that a foetus in utero in a 
continuing pregnancy will be subject to the same considerations, then it 
would appear that testing a foetus ‘purely for information’ will not always 
be appropriate. Clinical scenarios (i – carrier testing), (iv – testing for an 
adult onset condition), and (v – whole genome sequencing) may be deemed 
inappropriate on this reasoning; while scenarios (ii – testing for a minor 
condition) and (iii – testing for sex) will require further analysis. 
 
 
                                                     
16 Duncan et al, op. cit. note Error! Bookmark not defined., p. 1067. 
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SECTION IV. (HOW) DOES THE NON-INVASIVE ASPECT OF NIPT 
MAKE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO TEST FOR INFORMATION 
ONLY? 
 
When considering prenatal testing ‘purely for information,’ the most 
important clinical difference between invasive and non-invasive testing is 
the lack of risk. In this section we explain how this difference may affect the 
debate on testing foetuses for information only.  
 
As mentioned above, NIPT poses no medical risk to the viability of a 
pregnancy. Opening up access to NIPT may therefor increase the overall 
uptake of NIPT and may attract those whose reluctance to test purely for 
information had been due solely to the risk of miscarriage. In clinical 
scenario (v), involving Ms E considering whole genome sequencing for her 
foetus, this might include non-health traits, such as muscle fibre types 
associated with athletic ability. Such tests might pejoratively be termed 
‘frivolous,’ given that they are motivated by a mere interest in the 
information rather than for medical reasons. 
 
In this context, we take ‘frivolous’ testing to mean testing that is motivated 
by values that are not worthy of being taken seriously. However we 
recognise that this needs further qualification in order to be meaningful in 
practise. At their extremes, the notions of frivolous and non-frivolous will 
be universally (though not comprehensively) shared. For example, using 
NIPT to detect foetal rhesus status to detect risk of haemolytic disease of the 
newborn (preventable via administering anti-D to the pregnant woman) is a 
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good candidate for a non-frivolous reason. As a comparator, clinical 
scenario (ii), involving testing for a condition that only indicated height, 
purely for information, would be harder to defend; why would this 
information be needed in pregnancy? Nevertheless, there are traits and 
motivations that lie between these extremes (perhaps such as clinical 
scenario (iii) involving sex testing), and frivolity is subjective. Drawing the 
boundaries between those values to be taken seriously and those that should 
not be is a challenging task, and we will not attempt it here. Rather, we raise 
this as a moral principle by which access to NIPT purely for information 
could be allowed or restricted. 
 
For minor conditions or traits, removing the risk of prenatal testing may 
open up a host of possibilities for testing out of curiosity; as several of the 
clinical scenarios in Section I suggest. On the other hand, the potential 
impact of the results for serious conditions (such as clinical scenarios (iv) or 
(v)) has not changed. NIPT may be disproportionately easy to undergo 
given the potential impact of the results. Therefore, when making a 
judgement about whether testing a foetus is acceptable, we should recognise 
that ‘frivolous’ testing might be in higher demand once the technology is 
simplified. Testing for serious childhood conditions will still entail a careful 
weighing of the potential benefits and harms, with only one of the potential 
harms (miscarriage) removed.  
 
Thus far we have largely focused on concerns about interests or the 
preservation of privacy for the future adult. There remains a more subtle 
objection to some prenatal testing, one which recognises a certain loss of 
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humanity or respect for persons. This is that ‘unnecessary’ testing in 
pregnancy may be regarded as troubling is that it may objectify the foetus 
and resulting child. By making an effort to reveal certain traits, the 
expectant parents in several of the above clinical scenarios would be 
showing an inappropriately motivated interest in those traits, and in doing so 
would be expressing their views about what they valued. That expectant 
parents could value a non-serious characteristic of their foetus this much is, 
to some, distasteful.  
 
A helpful approach might be to consider that of the ‘virtuous’ parent17 or 
perhaps a ‘virtuous counsellor.’ While a detailed analysis of this concept is 
beyond the scope of this paper, relevant questions relate to the kind of 
parents that women and couples should aim to become (or the kind of 
professional someone practising in this area should be), what information 
couples require in order to be at least a ‘good (enough)’ parent, and what 
information is not required and might even be regarded as excessively 
intrusive? From a virtue-oriented perspective, there is no reason to 
distinguish actions of a parent or professional towards a future child from 
those towards a young child. There is no need to generate unhelpful 
information in the short term if that information might lead to harm or an 
invasion of privacy of the future child or adult. It is difficult to see any 
justification for generating such 'trivial' information from this perspective. 
 
 
                                                     
17 See, for example: McDougall R. Parental virtue: a new way of thinking about the 
morality of reproductive actions. Bioethics 2007; 21: 181-9. 
 21 
Considering the clinical scenarios in Section I, if a woman or couple elected 
to have NIPT to test for carrier status (scenario (i)), stature (scenario (ii)), or 
everything (scenario (v)), she may be putting undue value on this 
information and demonstrating a distasteful degree of interest in her future 
child’s genome. Testing out of curiosity does not itself seem to be 
particularly morally problematic (for example the incidental indication of 
sex during medical ultrasound)18 but it may seem distasteful to test for 
certain traits. Doing so is not harmful in itself, but it may be an expression 
or indication of an attitude that is not in keeping with a parent who values 
his or her child for who that child is, not the traits it will have. 
 
The clinical scenario that is less obvious to make a determination on is 
Scenario (iii), involving sex identification in early pregnancy. NIPT for 
foetal sex is already available and is used ‘purely for information’ by people 
like Ms C and her partner. In genuine cases of ‘information only’ this is 
fairly trivial information and could be said to be analogous to determination 
of sex via ultrasound (which many parents opt to do).19  
 
                                                     
18 What counts as ‘frivolous’ varies between cultures and individuals. Sex determination, 
for example, is not a mere curiosity in many cultures. Foetal sex determination is illegal in 
some jurisdictions because such information is frequently abused, and is leading to major 
shifts in sex ratios: Manchanda S, Saikia B, Gupta N, et al. Sex ratio at birth in India, its 
relation to birth order, sex of previous children and use of indigenous medicine. PLoS One 
2011; 6(6): e20097. 
19 This is a good example of a case in which testing ‘for information only’ may lead to 
action on the basis of information, and to wider socially damaging consequences. While 
this use of NIPT may appear innocuous, we should also be mindful that it could greatly 
exacerbate discrimination against women in misogynistic societies if it were to lead to 
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Finally, the wider context of this kind of testing should not be overlooked. 
For example, legitimate questions remain as to how such testing would be 
funded, and who would have access to it. Testing for non-medical traits 
using NIPT is likely to be considered outside the remit of either private 
health insurance or a state-funded health service, possibly rendering this 
kind of testing a luxury only for those who can afford it. If a state-funded 
health care system did fund such tests, this would presumably be costly, and 
could further stretch scarce resources (such as access to genetic 
counsellors).20 The justice of offering NIPT for information, particularly if 
an offer of testing is made in the context of a screening programme, also 
raises issues around the responsibility of health professionals (such as 
genetic counsellors) to help ensure that any screening programs 
incorporating NIPT target serious conditions and do not impinge on a 
child’s right to an open future.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
We began this paper by posing the question of whether it is ethically 
acceptable to use NIPT to perform genetic tests on a foetus when the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
termination of pregnancies of female fetuses. This must be tackled at the global level as 
there is a global market in such technologies. While foetal sex testing is (usually) non-
medical it is also clearly not always trivial in its consequences. To this end, in reflecting on 
the use of NIPT ‘purely for information’, we should also be mindful of the larger context in 
which this technology operates and consider whether apparently trivial traits may lead to 
wider socially damaging  consequences when incorporated into NIPT. 
20 With thanks to two anonymous reviewers for this point. 
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purpose of that test is purely to gain information about the foetus and not to 
seek a termination of pregnancy. We have made the case that a 
consideration of interests and privacy applies equally to children and 
foetuses, since they are on the same trajectory to adulthood, and that the 
same boundaries for testing children should apply for prenatal testing 
‘purely for information’. 
 
Unlike invasive testing, NIPT has the potential to allow prenatal testing for 
information without the critical drawback of risk of miscarriage. Healthcare 
professionals and prospective parents should recognise that the removal of 
risk would not make the results any less significant, and they should regard 
a prenatal test as seriously as they would a test during childhood, whether 
the test is requested or offered as part of a screening programme. A second 
effect of the removal of the risk of miscarriage is that there will be one 
fewer reason against testing for what we have termed ‘frivolous’ traits. The 
remaining objections to allowing testing for such traits are that it objectifies 
the foetus and future child and is not part of a virtuous parent’s conduct.  
 
The claims we have made in this paper can perhaps be drawn together under 
a consideration of the kinds of parents that women and couples should aim 
to become. Those seeking NIPT purely for information, such as those 
described in Section I, should be encouraged to reflect on their motivations 
for such a request and the impact this information may have on their 
pregnancy and child once it is born. We may not yet have precise 
‘informational expectations’ that could be said to be reasonable to have in 
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pregnancy, but we suggest that the information that is necessary to fulfil this 
expectation may not be as voluminous as we might initially think. 
